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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
}
Plaintiff-Respondent,
- vs. RAYMOND DODGE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

10771

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Raymond Dodge, appeals from
a conviction of the crime of first degree perjury on
Jury trial in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber
County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with
the crime of first degree perjury. A jury trial was
held September 28 and 29, 1966. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty as charged, and the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley imposed sentence upon the appellant of confinement in the state prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
Second District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent fundamentally agrees with the
statement of facts submitted in the appellant's brief,
but offers the following as a more detailed and accurate statement of evidence as received at trial
during the presentation of the state's case.
Mr. Cecil Tucker, an official court reporter, testi·
fied that on the 10th day of December 1965 he had
occasion to report the testimony of a habeas corpus
proceeding brought by Tommy Danks agaim:.t
Warden John Turner (T-11). During this hearing the
appellant, after being sworn (T-12), testified on be·
half of Tommy Danks. Appellant when asked if he
had seen Bill Newbold during the month of March,
1965, in a tavern on 25th Street, stated Bill Newbold
had been pointed out to him. Further that Bill New·
bold, during a conversation, explained to appellant
that in order to avoid difficulty with his wife he
(Newbold) had falsely accused Tommy Danks of the
crime of robbery (T-23). The appellant had likewise
testified the date of the meeting in the 25th Street
tavern was either the 18th or 19th of March, 1965
(T-25).
Bill Newbold testified that he could not recall
having seen the appellant prior to the habeas corpus
hearing in December 1965 (T-26). On the 10th of
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March, 1965, he was admitted to an Ogden hospital
for a double hernia operation (T-26). As a result of
the operation, and subsequent complications, Newbold stated he did not leave either the hospital or his
home from March 10th to March 18th, 1965 (T-27).
During the period of time between March 14, 1965,
and April 25, 1965, Newbold did not go to 25th Street
for any reason (T-40).
Doctor Keith Stratford testified he performed
surgery upon Bill Newbold on the 11th of March,
1965 (T-30). The doctor stated infection developed
in the incision complicating Newbold's post-operative recovery (T-31). It was further testified by the
doctor that Newbold did not appear capable of going anywhere but home when he examined him on
March 19, 1965.
Mrs. Lorraine Newbold testified that from March
14, 1965, until April 22, 1965, her husband, Bill Newbold, did not leave their home except to visit the office of Doctor Stratford (T-71).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
REGARDING THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
SECOND DEGREE PERJURY BECAUSE APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT REQUESTED.

The record does not disclose any request to the
trial court on the part of appellant to submit the
issue of perjury in the second degree to the jury.
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Absent such timely and appropriate request, appellant may not complain of the court's failure to give
such instructions. The respondent concedes perjury
in the second degree is an included offense in the
charge of perjury in the first degree. State v. Hutch·
inson, 4 Utah 2d 404, 295 P .2d 345 (1956).
This court addressing the issue in State v. Sulli·
van, 73 Utah 582, 276 Pac. 166 (1929) said:
Before the defendant can be heard to complain because trial court did not instruct upon the law of
lesser offenses included within the crime charged
such defendant must have requested instructions
upon the included offense or offenses. (citing numerous cases).

Justice Larsen observed in State v. DuBois, 98
Utah 234, 98 P.2d 354 (1940):
Having approved the instructions as given and requested no others, counsel should not be heard to
complain that the court did not constitute itself
counsel in the cause, and submit other theories not
urged by defendant just because the court may
think such theories of defense could have been
urged. It is the court's duty to try the issues made
by the parties and not make cases for them. We have
held that where instructions are palpably erroneous
to such an extent that they would, if followed by the
jury prevent a fair and proper determination of the
issues, we may notice the error without exception
being taken. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952
(1936); State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647
(1937). But we are aware of no holding that the
.mere failure to give an instruction which might have
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been given but which was not requested or called to
the attention of the court, and no exception taken
to the failure to be given will be noticed on appeal.
(Emphasis added.)

The respondent submits that the failure to give
an instruction on the included offense on perjury
in the second degree falls under the general rule of
the DuBois case, and is not within the exception of
the Cobo case.
The appellant in his brief does not define or
particularize the basis upon which he feels there
was an evidentiary basis for an instruction on the
law of perjury in the second degree. Therefore, taking the evidence as most favorable to the trial court's
ruling, it appears there is no factual basis for the
publication of such an instruction. Authorities are in
accord with this principle. 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 798
0 945) states in part:
Where, under the evidence the defendant must' be
either guilty of the crime charged or not guilty of
any, the general rule is that the court is not required,
and may refuse, to instruct the jury as to include offenses or inferior degrees thereof.

Accord: State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 53i
0923); State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 126 Pac. 286
0912).
The respondent submits, therefore, that the appellant was not entitled to an instruction on a lesser
included offense.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANT DOES NOT RAISE ISSUES
COGNIZABLE BY THIS COURT IN POINTS 2 AND 3 OF
HIS BRIEF.

The appellant on page 5 of his brief simply
states a failure on the part of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the joint union of act and
intent. Appellant fails to elaborate or point out
wherein the evidence is insufficient. On page 7 of
his brief appellant argues the incompetency of his
counsel at trial. Likewise, he fails to cite the record
in support of his allegations and conclusions stated
in the argument supporting point 3 of appellant's
brief. It is respondent's position that issues presented
by brief in this manner are not appropriate for review by this court. Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah
359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952); In Re Levelles Estate, 122
Utah 253, 248 P.2d 372 (1952).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING
A SENTENCE WHICH WOULD BE CONSECUTIVE TO
A TERM PROVIDING FOR A MAXIMUM OF LIFE IN
PRISONMENT.

Judge Charles G. Cowley of the Second Judicial
District, after receiving a verdict of guilty from the
jury, sentenced the appellant to serve a term of not
less than one nor more than five years in the Utah
State Prison (T-164). This sentence was to run consecutively with a fifteen year to life indeterminate
term being served by the appellant at the time the
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perjury offense was committed (T-161-162). Under
Utah statutes a person having been deemed to be
an habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than fifteen
years. (Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-18 (1953)). Assuming
arguendo, that appellant correctly regards a sentence under this above statute as being one for a
maximum of life imprisonment his argument must
of necessity fail. The sentencing judge, as required
by law, correctly imposed judgment in making the
sentences consecutive. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-33
(1953).
If respondent correctly understands appellant's
argument, appellant argues once a defendant is
sentenced to life imprisonment he is immune from
punishment for further crime unless that crime is one
for which the sentence of death is imposed. The
state suffers from no such disability, and the contention has no foundation in law or reason. This
court, considering circumstances analogous to the
instant case in McCoy v. Severson. 118 Utah 502,
222 P.2d 1058 (1950) stated:
A realistic approach to the problem suggests that
neither a sentence for life nor a sentence from five
years to life means that a defendant will serve his
natural life in prison. There would have been no
occasion to permit the termination of commutation
if the Legislature intended that the terms could not
be made less. For all practical purposes, a sentence
for life must be considered in connection with the
powers of the Board to commute the sentence to a
fixed and shorter period. With this background, the
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Legislature, when it considered the statutes dealing
with consecutive sentences, amended one section as
late as 1917 and never expected life sentences from
its provisions. It must have intended to permit the
courts the right to sentence a defendant to serve a
period consecutive to the time his life sentence
might be terminated. Certainly the board of pardons
has so interpreted the Legislative intent for many
years.

It should be noted that although the statutes con·
trolling commutation of sentence or the granting of
pardons at the time of McCoy decision (Utah Code
Ann. § 67-0-1 (1943)) were repealled the substance
of that statute was reenacted into its present form. '
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-62-3 (1953).
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Similarly, in People v. Hayes. 9 Cal. App. 2d 157,
49 P.2d 288 (1935), the California District Court of
Appeals, dealing with facts similar to the instant
case, stated:
The fact that a prisoner who serve a life term, and
while serving such, dies in prison cannot serve other
sentences imposed for other offenses and running
consecutively does not prevent, as a matter of law
the imposing of such consecutive sentences, even
though . . . the additional penalty cannot be imposed, i.e., actually inflicted upon such life termer.
It might also be mentioned, that even where a
prisoner is serving a life sentence this does not mean
that he will remain in prison until he dies. Parole,
commutation, or pardon may release him from
prison long before his term of life ends.

The respondent submits, th3t the subsequent
consecutive sentence is not only permissible undE:r
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the circumstances of the instant case, but necessary
for proper judicial administration.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's contentions on appeal are totally
without merit. No basis exists for reversal. Therefore, respondent submits the conviction be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

